Ontology and the Regulation of Intellectual Property by Wilson, J
ONTOLOGY AND THE
REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
1. Introduction
Philosophical reflection on intellectual property (IP) is still very
young. Though lawyers have written much on the topic, the vast majority
of this writing is philosophically unsophisticated. This paper aims to at
least partially remedy this philosophical deficit by examining what
reflection on the ontology of intellectual property can add to our under-
standing of how to regulate IP. I argue that ontological reflection should
bring us to an important basic fact, namely that ownership of intellectual
property involves the ownership of types rather than tokens. This difference
in the ontological status of the objects owned makes a normative difference
as to how we should regulate ownership of intellectual property as compared
to tangible property.
I begin by arguing that the type-token distinction is the best way to
account for the ontology of intellectual property. I next argue that the re-
alisation that we are dealing with ownership of types rather than tokens
has important normative implications. In particular some of the standard
arguments in favour of private ownership of tangible property simply do
not apply in the case of ownership of types, while others apply only in an
attenuated way.
The following section examines the limitations of ontology as a
guide to the regulation of IP. While thinking through the normative impli-
cations of the type-token distinction is a necessary condition for a sound
regulatory approach to IP, it is certainly not sufficient. This is because
many of the specific questions about the regulation of intellectual property
that matter most in practice are not answerable by ontological reflection.
Such questions concern the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits
involved in the construction of public goods, rather than questions of
ontology. I end by briefly sketching what an adequate normative regulatory
model for IP might look like.
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2. Towards an Ontology for Intellectual Property
The kinds of intellectual constructs that are owned and controlled
through intellectual property regulations such as trademarks, patents, and
copyrights are, even at a glance, different in kind from the things that are
owned and controlled by laws which regulate the ownership of physical
property such as cars and bicycles.
Cars and bicycles are rival goods: one person’s use of them can
interfere with another person’s. For instance, you cannot ride your bike if
I have borrowed it. Cars and bicycles are also subject to degradation
through use: the more a car is driven, the quicker its parts will wear out.
The types of intellectual constructs which are the subjects of intellectual
property law are nonrival: one person’s singing a song in no way inter-
feres with another person’s singing it, and similarly for use of computer
software packages, and methods for making pharmaceuticals. Moreover,
such intellectual constructs are not (except in exceptional circumstances)
subject to degradation through overuse: as many people as they like can
sing “Happy Birthday” without the song wearing out.1 In Jefferson’s
words, ideas have the feature that “no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me,
receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me” (Jefferson 1813).
Ontology, at a very rough estimation, is the study of what there is. We
can distinguish between two different ontological projects: descriptive
ontology, and revisionary ontology (Strawson 1959, 10). Descriptive
ontology attempts to clarify which kinds of entities are presupposed by
our practices. Its aim is interpretive, and it does not attempt to say whether
the types of entities that our practices presuppose really exist. Revisionary
ontology attempts to get at the truth about what entities really exist, and
aims to persuade us to revise our current ontology in line with the correct
one. Little systematic philosophical thought has thus far been devoted to
the ontology of intellectual property, and so it seems important at this
stage to work out an adequate descriptive ontology which covers our
current practices—even if we may in the fullness of philosophical reflection
decide that the approach we should take to the ontology of intellectual
property is a radically revisionary one.
It seems relatively clear that a descriptive ontology of our current IP
practices should foreground the type-token distinction. The type-token
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distinction seems to be the best way of interpreting our practices, in large
part, because the other possibilities seem so obviously wrong. The rela-
tionship between the novel as owned and copyrighted by the author and
individual copies of the novel is not a part-whole relationship, because all
of the novel appears to be instantiated in each copy of it. Nor does the re-
lationship between a property and its instances seem to fit the bill. The
process as patented seems to be a structure that we deploy in creating
instances of the machine which performs the process; it does not seem to
be a mere way in which machines can differ.2 Nor does a set-member re-
lationship seem to be right, because sets have their members essentially,
so that if another member is added to a set, or a member is taken away
from it, we no longer have the same set. However, this is a very implau-
sible way of thinking about novels and their copies: we do not think that
anything metaphysically significant has happened to the novel Great Ex-
pectations itself if a copy of it is destroyed in a fire, or another is printed.
The type-token relation however seems to fit the bill appropriately,
as types do not have the feature that they have to change when one of their
tokens is destroyed or created, and they have a greater metaphysical
solidity than properties:
The crucial difference between types and sets is this: while the identity
of a set is determined by its actual membership, the identity of a type is de-
termined not by which tokens actually exist but by the condition that
something must meet to be one of its tokens. What makes the type K that
type is that it lays down a certain condition for something to be one of its
tokens; and it would still lay down this condition, and so would remain that
type, even if fewer, more, or different tokens satisfied it. (Dodd 2008, 1119)
3. Types, Tokens, and Ownership
Ownership of tangible property involves ownership of tokens,
whereas ownership of intellectual property involves ownership of types.
However, most of the arguments in favour of private ownership revolve
around factors that presuppose that ownership is of tokens rather than of
types. Some of these arguments, of which we shall consider four, simply
do not apply at all to types, while others have diminished force.
The first is Locke’s argument for the necessity of private appropria-
tion. Locke points out that if everything were held in common, and one
had to get the consent of every other person before one were allowed to
take anything from the common stock, then this would have absurd con-
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sequences: everyone would be forced to either starve to death or to steal
food from the common supply. Locke argues that given the importance of
our right to self-preservation, it is legitimate to take private ownership of
things which were previously held in common, so long as one does not
allow what one has appropriated to go to waste, and one’s act of appro-
priation leaves enough and as good for the next person (Locke 1690, II. 28).
While this argument seems powerful in the context of physical goods
that are necessary for survival, the argument simply does not apply in the
context of ownership of types (Shiffrin, 2001). Unlike tokens, types are
nonrival; and a type can be tokened any number of times. So while my
ability to read my token copy of Kant’s first Critique is interfered with by
your attempting to read my token copy, your reading a different token
copy in no way interferes with my ability to read my token copy. So if this
kind of argument from necessity or self-preservation has any force at all
in the context of types, it seems to speak against ownership of types: if
what matters is people being able to gain the access they need to essential
goods which are necessary for their flourishing, then this access is hampered
rather than facilitated by private ownership of intellectual property.
The second argument is the argument from the tragedy of the commons.
There is reason to think that where there are resources which can be used
by everyone and these resources are susceptible to degradation through
overuse, these resources will tend to degrade over time. In Hardin’s classic
example, if we have a field that is held in common, then people will tend
to overgraze it (Hardin, 1968). For it is in the interest of each shepherd to
ensure that they have as many sheep as possible, and that each of their
sheep are well-grazed; however if all (or most) shepherds behave in this
way, then the commons will get overgrazed, and its ability to support
sheep will soon be destroyed.3
However, the tragedy of the commons cannot occur in the case of types.
Types are not worn out or degraded as more and more tokens of them are
created; and so unlike a piece of land which can be overgrazed, there is no
such possibility in the case of creating tokens of types. So while economic
arguments about the degradation of the commons have frequently been
used as arguments in favour of regimes of private ownership of real property,
the same arguments cannot support private ownership of ideas.4
The third and fourth arguments have some force in the case of
ownership of types, but this force is diminished from their force in the
case of ownership of tokens. The third argument is the argument from fair
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benefit, where the basic idea is that when a person labours to create a new
object or to improve an otherwise unowned or commonly owned object,
then their labouring gives them a claim to the exclusive use of the
resource that they have improved our created.
Many if not most people feel the intuitive force of this idea. However
there are two different readings of the underlying moral principle that
justifies this judgement and only one of these readings gives strong
support to ownership of types. The first reading would be that if someone,
through their own labour, improves a resource that is unowned or held in
common, then they thereby gain a right to the full use of that item—and
owing to the fact that such goods are rival and that others’ use will tend to
limit the labourer’s ability to use the item they have improved or
created—they thereby also have the right to exclude others from its use.
On the second reading, if someone through their own labour improves a
resource that is unowned or held in common, then they thereby gain a
right to the full use of that item and the right to exclude others from its
use, even where others’ use might not limit their use of it.
On the first reading, the right to exclude others only accrues to the
person who labours because of the type of thing to which the person has
laboured: because tokens are rival, a person cannot gain full ownership
and use of a token without being able to exclude others from the use of
that token. If we adopt this reading then the right to exclude would not
carry over to the case of types: for the person who devises a new dance
step could dance their new step as much as they like, regardless of
whether others are also dancing the step. It is only if we adopt the second
reading that it would follow that labouring to create or improve a type
should give you a right to exclude others from the nonrivalrous use of that
type. Which reading is to be preferred? I am inclined to think that the first
reading better expresses our considered moral convictions, because it is
far from clear to me why we should think that anyone has a morally com-
pelling interest in excluding others from nonrivalrous uses of types.5
The fourth argument is the argument from productivity. The basic
idea of this argument is that unless we allow private appropriation, there
will be insufficient incentive for people to put in the necessary effort to
improve resources that are currently unowned or held in common. If
everyone is able to benefit from my work, then it will typically be irra-
tional in self-interested terms for me to put in the effort to improve the
resource unless I can exclude others from its use.
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This argument does have some force for the ownership of types, but
again we need to be careful in thinking about the differences we introduce
in switching from tokens to types. Types are by nature much more difficult
to exclude other people from than are tokens (a particular piece of land
can be fenced off, and a bicycle can be locked away in a shed, but it is
much more difficult to make ideas exclusive). So to that extent, it might
look as if there is an even greater need for private intellectual property to
ensure productivity than there is for private physical property. However,
the nonrivalrousness of types means that nonexclusivity is in a different
sense less of a problem than it is in the case of rival goods. If I have
sufficient self-interested reason to work to improve or devise a type for
my own purposes, then the fact that the type is nonexclusive will not
dissuade me from putting in the effort. For instance, many of the people
who contribute to open source software describe their motivation in self-
interested terms: they have a particular problem they want to solve, and
they write a program to solve it. The fact that others can then benefit from
their work need not provide a disincentive for them, and if they are even
moderately altruistic may provide an incentive. This makes the case of
software rather different from, say, growing tomatoes: my ability to enjoy
my tomatoes is interfered with if you eat them; while my ability to use my
program is not interfered with if you use it too.
Taken together these ontological reflections show that private intel-
lectual property is rather more difficult to justify than private physical
property. Certainly this ontological reflection should bring us to see that
there cannot be any pre-legislative entitlements to ownership of private in-
tellectual property. As Jefferson puts it, “Inventions then cannot, in nature,
be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits
arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will
and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from
anybody” (Jefferson 1813; also Wilson 2009).
4. The Limitations of Ontology
Recognising that ownership of types has different normative impli-
cations from ownership of tokens is vital in thinking through how we
should regulate intellectual property. But there are at least four ways in
which our current systems for intellectual property regulation depart from
the bare type-token distinction. Given this, the bare type-token distinction
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is not sufficiently conceptually rich to explain how we currently regulate
IP, and it would require a rather revisionary (and as we shall see, unwisely
revisionary) approach to bring our current practices in line with the bare
type-token distinction. Ontology can do no more than provide a rough
guide, and cannot on its own tell us how to regulate IP. We need a richer
approach to IP, which takes to heart the lessons we have just seen about
the ownership of types, but places them in a broader regulatory context in
which egalitarian considerations of fairness and requirements of incen-
tivisation are reconciled.
The first and most obvious difference between the type-token rela-
tionship and our current regime for the regulation of IP is that intellectual
property regulations are of limited duration, while type-token relation-
ships are not. If something has the right features to be a token of type X,
then anything in the future with the same features will also be a token of
the same type. However judgements of infringement in intellectual property
depend not just on the question of whether the new object has the right
features to be a token of the type X, but also whether the type X is still
within the duration of the relevant intellectual property regulations. This
means that performing one and the same action, such as making use of a
certain formula to manufacture a pharmaceutical, will have a different legal
status depending on whether the drug is still within the patent period. It will
be an infringement of intellectual property rights to make a generic version
of a pharmaceutical one year and not the next, though the law has not changed.
Someone might take the view that the ontological distinction between
type and token is the only thing that matters in IP regulation. On such a
view, we should strike down all the elements in IP regulation that are not
derivable from the ontology of the type-token distinction, and hence we
should not make our intellectual property regulations time-bound.
However, this would be a deep mistake. Regulation is properly responsive
to human interests and to reflection on the type of society we are trying to
create; while it should not incorporate any obvious ontological errors, it is
a mistake to think that we should not include any distinctions in our reg-
ulations for which we cannot find corresponding ontological differences.6
Moreover, the ontology of intellectual property shows that it is more
difficult to justify private ownership of intellectual property than private
ownership of physical property. Hence it is better to think of the ontology
here as setting limits to the kind of ownership claims that are legitimate,
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rather than licensing the claim that because the type-token relationship is
eternal, so should be our intellectual property restrictions.
The second way in which our current intellectual property regime is
more complex than the bare type-token distinction relates to causation.
The type-token distinction considered in itself leaves it open whether a
token has to have a particular causal history in order to count as a token
of a particular type. (Suppose, for instance that a piece of metal physically
indistinguishable from a one Euro coin arises spontaneously through a
natural process. Does this count as a token of the type of one Euro coin?)
Under our current regime, some kinds of intellectual property rights
protect against the creation of tokens only with a certain causal history,
while others protect against the creation of new tokens regardless of their
causal history. Copyright and trade secrets prohibit copying of the
protected ideas, but do not make it illegal to invent the same object inde-
pendently. In the case of patents, independent invention is no defence (see
Trerise, this volume).
The third difference relates to novelty. Looking from the direction of
ontology, there is no requirement that each type be in any way original, or
more than minimally different from other types. Copyright follows this
approach, with a very low requirement for originality before a copyright
can be claimed, but we require that a patent shows a novel and non-
obvious inventive step, so that, in order to count as patentable, a type has
to be sufficiently far removed from already known types.
Putting these two differences together, we see that copyright imposes
a low bar on what you have to do in order to be able to claim a copyright,
whereas patent with its requirement of an inventive step implies a much
higher bar. Copyright, however only covers creation of ideas that are
influenced by the thing copyrighted, whereas patent covers also inventions
which incorporate the idea but which were invented entirely separately
from it.
Again, it seems implausible to think that we could find sufficient on-
tological differences to explain these different ways of regulating the
production of ideas in different domains. A revisionary view might say
that we should align all our intellectual property regulation with the type-
token distinction. But again there seems little reason to do so. The various
ways that the type-token distinction is interpreted in the different branches
of IP regulation seem to reflect judgements about the nature of the incen-
tives that it is necessary to provide in different areas, and judgements about
what is valuable about different types of creative activity. These are precisely
the kinds of ethical judgements we need if we are to regulate in a fair and
effective manner.
The fourth point of difference concerns the specificity of types. The
type-token distinction leaves open the possibility (and is usually thought
to imply) that there can be an infinite number of types, and that one and
the same object can stand in the relationship of token to any number of
very slightly different types. For example, one and the same chair can be
a token of the type of furniture, the type of items designed by Bernard
Schmidt, the type of items in the IKEA catalogue, and so on. This
fecundity of types and tokens threatens to be problematic in the case of in-
tellectual property regulation. For in judging whether one work infringes
(or ought to be taken to infringe) the copyright on another, we want to
know not whether there is a type such that the two pieces of writing are
both tokens of that type (presumably there will always be a sufficiently
general type such that any two things count as tokens of it), but rather
whether both pieces should count as tokens of the relevant type.
We could if we wished explicate the relevant type in wider or in
narrower ways. For instance, at its very narrowest, we could identify the
type with a particular sequence of words. In this case, changing a single
word (let alone translating the work into a different language) would mean
that we were no longer dealing with tokens of the same type. Or at its
broadest we could think of the relevant type in terms, say, of underlying
plot structures (in which case we could say that all romantic comedies
would fall under the same type).7
Could further ontological reflection help us to pick out what we
should take the relevant type to be? I do not think so, because it is not the
case that the readings that make the relevant type either narrower or
broader than those we ourselves favour fail to pick out a genuine type at
all. For instance, it seems that the particular sequence of words that Eliot
published as The Wasteland is a genuine type, of which there can be
tokens. The problem with taking this sequence to be the relevant type
would not be ontological: rather it would be that there are reasons internal
to the goals of what we are trying to achieve in regulating intellectual
property which make it unhelpful to pick out the bare sequence of words
as the relevant type. Picking such a narrowly defined type would create
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problematic loopholes in intellectual property regulation, and partly
because of this would tend to provide too small an incentive to creators to
produce new work.8
In short, the central question we need to answer in regulation of in-
tellectual property (and which will require differential answers in different
domains) is: “when should a particular use of ideas count as an infringe-
ment of the relevant intellectual property regulation?” Ontological
investigation can suggest a formal answer, namely “when it is an unau-
thorised tokening of a relevantly protected type”, but ontology cannot
determine what the relevant types are.
5. Conclusion: Regulation Beyond Ontology
In closing I shall indicate very briefly how we might integrate the
normative lessons from the ontology of intellectual property into a coherent
regulatory strategy (for details, seeWilson forthcoming). I suggest that we
should begin by making a distinction between rights and social goals.
Rights are legitimate moral claims that individuals have and that ought (in
usual circumstances) to be granted priority over other legitimate goals.9
Rights thus defined are highly resistant to aggregation: we cannot (in
general) violate one person’s rights in order to prevent others having their
rights violated. Each rights holder has a separate and weighty complaint
if their rights are violated. Goals are states of affairs that governments
should aim to promote.10 Goals are much less resistant to aggregation than
are rights: governments will often have to make tradeoffs in the pursuit of
their goals, and—assuming the tradeoffs are performed in a nondiscrimi-
natory and reasonable way—this is perfectly legitimate. Unlike rights,
individuals do not have separate and morally weighty complaints where
their government is making good-faith attempts to pursue a goal, but—
due to reasonable tradeoffs with the pursuit of other normatively valuable
goals—the government has not yet provided the aimed-for level of service
to that person.11
Given this distinction, the first task for regulators is to ensure that
they do not violate rights in the ways they regulate or fail to regulate.
Hence, when we are thinking about the regulation of IP we should start by
thinking about rights, and look and see whether there are any ways of reg-
ulating (or refusing to regulate) IP that might violate rights. There are two
obvious ways in which the regulation of IP might violate rights. First,
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refusing to enact robust private ownership rights over intellectual property
might violate the rights of creators; and second, enacting robust private in-
tellectual property legislation might violate the rights of those denied the
ability to make use of these privately owned objects.
I have argued that there are various features of types as opposed to
tokens that make it more difficult to justify private ownership in the case
of types than of tokens, and I have further argued that this should lead us
to think that there are no rights in this strong sense of rights to own intel-
lectual property. A further question arises as to whether it is possible to
violate the rights of potential users of intellectual property by depriving
them of access to IP goods. If there are positive rights to basic medicines,
then it seems plausible to think that in certain circumstances we may
violate these rights.12
The second layer is that of social goals. The normative goal served by
private intellectual property is the production of an adequate supply of in-
tellectual goods. Private ownership of IP is justifiable—where it is—
because it is, all things considered, the best solution to the public goods
problem in the regulation of the production of new ideas. There are other
normative goals, such as the construction and maintenance of a society of
equals, which will tend to conflict with the use of private intellectual property
as a strategy for ensuring an adequate supply of intellectual property goods.
A society of equals is one in which each citizen can look each other in the
eye and think of herself as of equal status to each other person. The goal
of a society of equals is undermined where there are goods which have a
large effect on the way which social status is negotiated, and which are
differentially spread (particularly when this reinforces existing patterns of
advantage and disadvantage). Conversely such a society is promoted where
goods and freedoms that are important for social status are available to
each on conditions of equality.
Nonrival goods are not capable of scarcity, and are hence capable of
being supplied to everyone who desires them. If there is a scarcity in the
supply of a given nonrival good, it is because we have elected to create an
artificial scarcity. This is different from the case of rival goods where we
frequently see “natural” scarcities. Because of this, ideas as goods have a
particular force for the goal of achieving a society of equals: because ideas
matter for human life, and because ideas can be made available to all at
only a marginal extra cost, the goal of a society of equals will push us
towards open access to ideas.
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Working out how to balance our commitments to equality and the need
to provide sufficient incentives to creators to ensure an adequate supply of
intellectual property goods is a complex task that I cannot undertake here.
The main point of this article has been to argue that reflection on the
ontology of intellectual property should form an essential part of the back-
ground to our regulatory framework for IP, but that working out the
specifics will require further first-order normative thinking.
James Wilson
Centre for Philosophy, Justice, and Health
University College, London
NOTES
1. Some information, such as racing tips, is rival: the more people who know that Bas-
ketcase has a good chance of winning the 3.15, the less favourable the odds will become.
In addition Landes and Posner (2003) argue that works released into the public domain
may suffer from congestion externalities, and that if so, the value of the underlying work
may be better husbanded by restricting access to it rather than allowing free access. Their
examples involve cases where a trademark (such as Mickey Mouse) could reduce in value
because of brand dilution.
2. The ontology of intellectual property objects is similar in many ways to the
ontology of musical works. Dodd argues on the same grounds that we should not think of
the ontology of music in terms of properties and instances: “While a property is repeatable
inasmuch as it is an entity capable of multiple instantiation by particulars, Vaughan
Williams’s Oboe Concerto looks categorially unsuited to be identified with a property of
its performances and playings. Rather than being a mere respect in which performances or
playings can be alike or differ, the work itself is the blueprint for such performances and
playings: a thing in its own right.” (Dodd 2008, 1118)
3. It is worth pointing out—as Ostrom (1991) and others have argued—that even
where rival goods are held in common, the tendency towards a tragedy of the commons is
by no means inevitable; rather there are various ways of regulating the commons which
can successfully protect and sustain it. So even in the case of common ownership of
physical resources, it is unclear how seriously we should take the idea of the tragedy of the
commons as an argument in favour of private property.
4. Insofar as there are sound economic arguments for intellectual property they will
have to focus on the incentives for the production of such goods, not the fear that they will
otherwise be used up, as in argument four below.
5. As Penner puts it, “The right to property is grounded by the interest we have in
using things in the broader sense. No one has any interest in merely excluding others from
things, for any reason or no reason at all” (2000, 70). I argue for these claims at greater
length in Wilson (2009), and also attempt a diagnosis of how and why some people
nonetheless find the second reading more plausible.
6. To give just one example, many countries legislate to ensure that buildings of
special architectural interest are protected against arbitrary changes by their owners. Such
a way of regulating is legitimate despite the fact that it seems very implausible to think that
there are sufficient ontological differences between architecturally uninteresting and ar-
chitecturally interesting buildings to justify this.
7. Over the past 150 years there has been a shift in copyright law from narrower
towards broader readings of what the relevant type is. For instance, when Harriet Beecher
Stowe tried to prevent the publication of unauthorised translations of Uncle Tom’s Cabin,
she lost on the grounds that copyright covered only copying of the relevant text and not its
translation. For a good overview of some of these changes, see Fisher (1999).
8. Adopting an over-broad conception of the relevant type will give us opposite
problems: it is likely to hamper the efforts of future creators so much that we will judge it
would have been better to have provided a narrower band of protection.
9. See for example Dworkin: “Rights are best understood as trumps over some back-
ground justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole.
If someone has a right to publish pornography, this means that it is for some reason wrong
for officials to act in violation of that right, even if they (correctly) believe that the
community as a whole would be better off if they did” (1984, 165–66).
10. We can distinguish between de facto goals (what states of affairs a government is
in fact aiming to promote), and normative goals (what states of affairs a government ought
to be aiming to promote). Our interest is in normative goals and the regulation of intellec-
tual property.
11. For instance, if you treat the desideratum that a person not wait for more than three
months before having a particular type of operation as their right, then that person’s right
has been violated if they have to wait four months before having their operation. If
however we treat this desideratum merely as a goal, then there is no reason to think that
the person who has to wait for four months has been wronged, so long as the government
has been making good-faith approaches towards the goal.
12. And if Pogge (2006) is correct, intellectual property rights may be able to violate
even negative rights.
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